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A bsmc t 
Although individuais with bw self-esteem both receive and enjoy positive feedback, their 
global leveis of self-esteem remain Iow over the .  in hopes of shedding light on this puzziing 
state of affairs, this research exvnined how people with low and high self-esteern (LSEs and 
HSEs) respond to positive feedback. Fiy-four female participants received taiiored feedback 
that they were high on a desired personaiity trait; HSEs and LSEs were rnatched on the self- 
discrepmcy of the feedback. Via a "Thinic-Aioud" procedure, participants' thoughts were 
exvnined for the presence of "self-cornpuison" processes, as weii as for their positivity versus 
negativity. Results indicated that, contrary to previous suggestions that HSEs and LSEs 
respond similarly to success, HSEs accepted the positive feedback to 3 greater extent than did 
LSEs. in addition, participants appewd to reach these conclusions through a deductive, "top- 
down" process, rather than by an inductive, "bottom-up" process. Implications for 
understanding the nature and maintenance of seIf-esteem, as weil as for clinicd interventions, 
are discussed. 
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Introduction 
People's globd leveb of self-esteem are quite stable over time, despite substuitiaî 
short-terrn fluctuations (e.g.. Brown, 1993a; Kemis. 1993). Research documenting such 
stability bodes well for individuds with high self-esteem (HSES). but not for individu& with 
low self-esteern (LSEs). What keeps LSEs low in self-esteem? It has k e n  shown that LSEs 
do believe that they have ût least some positive attributes and abilities (Brown, 1993a; Peihm, 
1993a), and clevly virtually ail do encounter some positive feedback. Further, there is 
evidence that LSEs enjoy positive feedback and that they genedy prefer positive feedback to 
negative feedback (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Biaine & Crocker, 1993; Brown, 
1993b; Swann, Peharn, & Kru& 1989). So the question becomes, if LSEs encounter positive 
feedback, and they enjoy it. why do their global levels of self-esteem stay low? It seems diat 
LSEs somehow do not mdce use of these doses of positive feedback to achieve the levels of 
self-esteem that their HSE counterpm do. We specuhted that this may be because LSEs are 
l e s  lütely to accept positive feedback thui HSEs. In the present study, we exvnined this 
possibility, and we sought to uncover the mechuiisms thm may underlie such a difîerentkd 
acceptance of positive feedback. 
Previous research cnnceniing people's responses to feedback has focused hrgely on 
reactions to negative feedback. This resevch has shown that, in general., HSEs use self- 
serving biases to o&t faiiure expenences, but that LSEs do not (e.g., Blake & Crocker, 
1993; Brown & Mankowski, 1993). For example, HSEs are more likely thm LSEs to 
discredit negative feedback. attrîbute their fdure to externd causes, devalue the task or uait in 
question, derogate others, exaggerate the percentage of people who share their Limitations. or 
compemte for the negative kedback by focusing on the2 strengths in other areas (e.g., B h e  
& Crocker, 1993; Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Wood & Dodgson, 1996). Less attention has 
been paid to reiictions to positive feed biick. Althoug h positive feedback conditions are 
included in most studies, their prirnary role iq to serve as cornparison groups for the more 
central fdure conditions. As a result, much l e s  is known about the ways in which HSEs and 
LSEs respond to success feedback. An exception to this rule is the cornmon finding that LSEs 
and HSEs do not differ in their affective reactions to positive feedback (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 
1993; Brown, 1993b; Shrauger, 1975; Swann et ai., 1987 ). Some resevchers have 
concluded fiorn such results t h ~ t  LSEs and HSEs do not differ in their responses to success, 
but only in their responses to fYlure (e.g., Brown & Miinkowski, 1993). 
However, affective reactions may not be the end of the story. Many theorists have 
argirgued that affective reactions represent only the outcome of initial, minimal processing of 
feedback, and that more cornplex cognitive processing foliows (e.g., Eisenstadt & Leippe, 
1994; Epstein, in press; Jussim, Yen, & AielIo, 1995; Morling & Epstein, 1997; Swann, 
1993). Indeed, severai researchers have found that HSEs and LSEs do d8er in their more 
cognitive reactions to positive feedback. SpecificûUy, HSEs are more Likely than LSEs to 
attribute positive outcomes to intemal causes, to fînd positive feedback especially credible and 
accurate, and to feel that they have control over producing positive outcomes ( B b e  & 
Crocker, 1993; Shuger  & Kelly, 1988; Shrauger & Rosenberg. 1970; S w m ,  Gr*, 
Predrnore, & Gaines, 1987). Two studies support our specdation that HSEs are more likely 
than LSEs to accept positive feedback: Resevch by Shmuger md his coileagues found that 
HSEs are more likely than LSEs to accept favounble stntements about themselves (Shuger 
& Kelly. 1988), and to respond to positive feedback by increashg their self-ratings in the 
domain of feedback (Shuger & Rosenberg. 1970). in the present study, we examined 
whether HSEs would corne to accept positive feedback more than LSES would, and we sought 
to understand the processes by which HSEs and LSEs reach their conclusions about feedback. 
Dflerentiallv D k r e ~ a n t  Feedbuk? 
One possible, if pedestrian, exphnation for why HSEs rnay accept positive feedback to 
a greater extent thm LSEs is thnt such feedback mm; be less self-discrepant and hence, more 
credble for HSEs thui for LSEs. Virtudy di studies of reactions to feedback have used 
feedback martipuhtions that deiiver the same success feedback to dl participants in the success 
condition (e.g.. Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Micheh, & Gaus, 1994). Although such 
manipulations seem to promise experimentai control because they offer superfïcially identical 
feedback, they actudy rnay not achieve the goal of delivering equd feedback to dl participants 
(cf. Morling & Epstein, 1997), because participants with v;uying levels of self-esteem may not 
perceive the feedbnck as equdy positive and self-discrepant. The two studies by Shnuger just 
discu.ssed (Shnuger & Kelly, 1988; Shnuger & Rosenberg, 1970), however, were unusud in 
that they did explore this possibility, by virtue of exûmining pre-test self-mtings fiom 
participants in the feedback domain. Thense studies indicated that even when their pre-feedback 
seif-views in the domain of feedback were equd, HSEs' reactions to the feedback were more 
positive thm those of LSEs. In the present study, we went 3 step M e r  by explicitly taiioring 
the positive feedback to individual participants to ensure that it was equdy self-discrepant for 
HSEs and LSEs. Shrauger's findings sugest that the two self-esteem groups would d8er in 
their acceptace of the positive feedback nonetheless. However, we delivered positive 
feedback on personality tn i ts  that participants had identified as i s y  self-discrepant- 
Participants were told that they possessed "Ideal-seif" traits-traits they had said eulier thnt 
they wanted CO possess but did not (cf. Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994). Would HSEs corne to 
iicçept suçh kedback more than LSEs? 
SeK-Cornparison Processes 
LSEs may accept positive feedback to a lesser extent thm HSEs if the way that 
feedback is processed results in dserent outcornes for them than for HSEs. A number of 
theorists have proposed that when individu& receive new information about themselves, they 
conduct some form of self-cornparison to evduate whether or not they should accept and 
integmte that information (e.g., Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994; Esses, 1989; Jussirn et 1. 1995; 
S wann & Schroeder, 1 995). These self-comparison theories suggest that people compare the 
feedback with what they aiready know about themselves, to evduate its phusibility and to 
determine conclusions about it. However, it is not clev precisely how this process opentes. 
For exmple, Eisenstadt and Leippe (1994) suggest that when people receive feedback, they 
automatically compare it with their Actud self-concepts (who they think they currently are), 
their Ided self-concepts (who they would k e  to be but are not), and their Rejected self- 
concepts (who they would not W<e to be and are not), in search of a match for the feedback. 
But how do people determine where this match Lies? Do they compare the feedback with 
specific experiences nom their past, with theu pre-existing surnmaty judgments of their 
attributes, or with their ovenll self-concepts? 
Severd perspectives cm be generated that describe how a self-cornpuison process may 
unhld. These perspectives vary in their emphasis on "bottom-up" versus "top-down" 
processes. By "bottom-up," we d e r  to an inductive process, in which people consider 
specific, concrete pieces of evidence in order to draw a broader conclusion* By "top-dom," 
we refer to a more deductive process, whereby higher-level generahtions colour the 
interpretation of specific pieces of information. Next we identQ four perspectives on how 
people process feedback that dEer in their focus on these two types of reasoning. 
The Obiective Bottom-UR Perspective 
One pmsibility for how people proces self-relevant feedback is that they take a purely 
bottom-up npproach, evduating new inf«rmation about themselves in a methodica objective 
fashion, idch to the way an impartial scientkt evaluates data. That is, people may begin at the 
"bottom" by coUecting and evduating specific pieces of evidence fiom their past experience, 
with which they compare the new feedback. This evidence may e n t a  for instance, memories 
of behaviours relevant to the feedback (e.g., Locksley & Lenauer, 198 1). For example, when a 
woman receives feedback that she is extraverted, she may recd  times when she w u  outgoing 
at parties, times when others cded her shy, and my other previous expenences rehted to her 
level of extraversion. She may then use such "evidence" as the bais for an objective decision 
about whether or not she is extraverted--perhaps by weighting and summing her level of 
extraversion in erich experience, for instance. 
The Motivationdv B k d  Bottom-UD Perspective 
Another possibility is that people may ccnduct bottom-up evidence searches that are 
biased to support certain conclusions. For example, Kunda md her coiieagues have found that 
people b i s  thei memory searches to recmit memories that support a desired self-view (e.g., 
Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989). in one study, SYiitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) 
found that when people were motivated to see thernselves as either exmverted or inuovened, 
they reported more memories for whichever trait had k e n  described as desirable. Presumably 
they had selectively recmited memories to support the conclusion that they desired. For 
example, if led to believe that extraversion wûs desirable. a participant may have focused on 
the times she was outgoing, nther than shy. 
Such fïndings dernonstrate what k known as a b4seIf-enhancement" b i s .  Self- 
enhancement theories suggest that people are motivated by a desire to see themselves 
pmitively (e-g., Jussim et d., 1995; Shrauger, 1975; Swann et aL, 1987). nius. people 
rnotivated to self-enhance may b i s  their evidence searches towards supporting positive 
feedback. However, a biased evidence search could be driven by other motivations as weL 
According to "self-verifkation" (e.g., S w m  1983, 1990) and "self-consistency" (e.g., Jussim 
et al., 1995) theories, people are motivated to maintain their self-concepts out of a desire for 
predictability and control over their worlds, w hether their self-concepts are negative or 
positive. LSEs rnay be particulvly motivated to maintain their poor self-images because they 
may feu that they could not meet the heightened expectations that rnay be phced upon them if 
their self-image irnproved (e.g., Maine & Crocker, 1993). They may aisa feu  that adopting a 
better self-image would create a "set up" for Iater fsiilure and disappointment (e.g.. Blaine & 
Cmcker, 1993; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Tice, 1993). People motivated to seE-venfy 
may bias their evidence sevches towvds supporting feedback that would maintain their 
current self-views. 
Although Kunda and her colleagues have demonstrated that people may bias their 
evidence searches to support a desired conclusion, they dso found that people changed their 
self-concepts oniy to the extent that their prior self-knowledge would permit, according to a 
sort of "redity consu;iinr" For exmple, even when motivated by n beiief that introversion 
w u  desirable, people who previously saw themselves as very exmverted shifted their self- 
conceptions only s d  degree towards introversion. Such studies support a centrd tenet of 
the perspectives incorpomting bottom-up processes, namely that people's conclusions about 
feedback are conîtnined by the evidence they c m  recruit to support it. For example, 
Eisenstadt and Leippe ( 1994) suggest that if people cm find sufficient evidence to support 
feedback on a domain they previously considered p a n  of their Ideal-sel- they wiU accept the 
feedback and integrate it into their Actuu self-concepts. but that if they cannot 6nd sufficient 
evidence, they wiU not accept the feedback. 
The Domain-Soecific To P-Do wn Perspective 
Ln contrat to perspectives that focus on bottom-up evidence seuches, 'top-down7* 
perspectives suggest that people's conclusions rbo ut self-rekvant feedback are reached 
thro ugh deductive reasoning h m  more genenl self-kno wledge. Research has sho wn that pre- 
existing self-views may indeed colour responses to feedback. People's initial expectuicies 
about themselves aEect their recall of and judgment of the credibility of feedback. For 
example, feedback dut is consistent with a person's view of his or her own cornpetence is 
better remernbered than feedback that k inconsistent with that view (Shnuger, 1975). Self- 
schemata, which represent information about one's personality and other aspects of self- 
concept, appev to guide how people take in, rernember, and m&e inferences about new self- 
relevant infornation (e.g.. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). For exmple, Markus ( 1977) found that 
people based predictions for their future behwiour on their existing self-schemaa and were 
resistant to accep ting information inconsistent with those schemata. People who considered 
themselves to be "independent," for instance, were resistant to feedback that they were 
"conf~nning.~* 
Moreover, research by Klein, Lc~ftus. and their coiieagues argues against the cruciai 
role that bottom-up perspectives wign to autobiogrs~phical mernories in the establishment and 
maintenance of self-views (e-g., Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996). These researchea (and 
others, e.g., Lord, 1993) have argued that self-knowledge about one's traits is not represented 
by a cciiiection of b e h a v i d  exemplars, but is stored in an absuact, surnmary form in 
rnernory. A series of studies investigated whether recalling speçific behaviounl exempiars of a 
trait stored in memory facilitatecf people's judgments about the self-descriptiveness of that 
trait. Results suggested that it did not; dthough behaviourd exemplius hfiuenced people's 
self-descriptiveness judgments under certain conditions (e.g., in a domain in which they had 
little expenence), behaviod exemphs were never required to make such judgments (e.g., 
Klein & Loftus, 1993a, 1993b; Klein et al., 1996). Instead, individuais were able to evaiuate 
the descriptiveness of a trait based ody on self-knowledge at an absmct, semantic leveL 
These findings contradict the bo ttom-up view that people must recmit specifîc evidence 
fkom memory to ûssess the accuracy of self-relevant feedback. However, the studies by Klein 
et al leave unclear whether the rbstnct knowledge that people use to make self- 
descriptiveness judgments is domain-specific, or is based on o v e d  levels of self-esteem. That 
k, top-down pmcessing may be driven by self-views in specifk domnins relevant to the 
feedback (cf. Markus, 1977). or by more global or abstract self-views (cf. Shrauger & Keiiy, 
1988). For exmple. when one receives feedback that one is extnvened. one's judgment 
about whether to accept that feedback may be based on one's prior beliefs about one's 
extraversion, or on one's giobai self-esteem. The former view-that feedback recipients 
consult summary judgments or self-schernata in the domain relevant to the feedback--is what 
we c d  the "domain-specinc top-down" perspective. 
The Glo bai Too-Down Pers~ective 
The view that people instead base their judgments about feedback on their overail self- 
esteem is what we refer to as a 44gbbd top-down" perspective. For example, Esses ( 1989) has 
suggested that feedback may be compared with generai positive or negative views of the self 
stored in memory. Feedback that one is extnverted, for instance, would be evaluated for iü 
match to one's overd self-concept, not to one's belief about one's extraversion in particulu: 
Higher self-esteem wauld result in more favourable judgments of one's extraversion, and lower 
seif-esteem would result in l e s  favourrble judgments. 
A global top-down perspective concerning processing of feedback aisa foiIows fiom 
Brown's "top-down" view of self-esteern (Brown, 1993b; Brown & Dutton, 1995). Pnor 
conceptions of self-esteem have partrayed it as the additive product of a number of evduations 
of oneself in a vviety of specific domains (see, e.g., Brown, 1993b; Pelhm & Swann, 1989). 
For exmple, the belief that one has r number of positive attributes--say, that one is intelligent, 
attractive, and athletic--should produce a high level of global self-esteem. In conuast, 
Brown's top-do wn perspective suggests that the reverse is tme: Self-esteem may d e t e d e  
the specific self-beiiefs one holds. Thus, one would not have high self-esteem becwse one 
believes that one is intelligent, attractive, and athietic; rather, one would believe that one is 
intelligent, attractive, and athletic because one has high self-esteem. In addition, Brown 
( 1993b) suggests t hat seif-esteem is ûnectively mther than cognitively based-that self-esteem 
is an affective disposition towards the self that colours people's specific self-views. Brown's 
theory, when applied to the receipt of feedback, may suggest that ggbbal seresteem guides 
pmcessing of feedback in a l e s  direct manner than Esses (1989) h a  proposed. Global self- 
esteem may influence the pmcessing of feedback relevant to specific se~views via its 
deterrnining effect on those self-views. For ermple, a woman's global self-esteem would 
colour her interpretation of how extraverted she is, which in tum would colour her 
interpretation of feedbock that she is extnverted. Altematively, perhaps giobal self-esteem 
mciy co b ur feedback directly, in the sûme m m e r  as Bm wn suggests it colours specific self- 
vie ws, 
Does one's global self-esteem or one's domain-specific self-view drive top-do wn 
reactiom to feedback? Swann et aL's research (1989) argues for the latter, at least in the r e h  
of feedback seeking. They found that when people believed that they were going to receive 
feedback on a domain in which they felt weak, both USES and LSEs sought negative 
feedbxk-that is, they sought feedback consistent with their specific self-views, regxdless of 
their global levels of self-esteem (Swann et ai., 1989). These authors suggest that this hding 
is consistent with other "evidence that mesures of specifïc self-views axe better predictors of 
behaviour than are mesures of global seif-esteern" (Swanri et al., 1989, p. 788). However, in 
conuast, Shrauger and coleagues' findings (descnbed eariier) that HSEs and LSEs difZer in 
their responses to feedback even when they do not djffer on their pre-feedback self-views in 
the feedback domain support the global top-down perspective (Shrauger & Keliy, 1988; 
Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; Shnuger & Soman, 1977). Furthemore, û recent study by 
Story ( 1998) found that individu&' memory for feedback was not predicted by the 
congruence of the feedbûck to their pretest self-ratings on the feedback dimension, but by the 
congruence of the feedback with their overd Ieveis af self-esteem. 
We have described these top-down perspectives in very cognitive tem. Based on the 
deductive nature of top-down processing (in which o conclusion is hrgely pre-determined), it 
seems unlikely that it wouid be susceptible to type of process-altering b i s  thût we descnbed in 
the context of bottom-up pmcessing. Top-down processes could, however, opente in the 
service of motivations. Because these perspectives hold thnt one's pre-existing self-view 
(whether global or domain-specfic) guides the processing of feedback, such processing would 
ultixnately perpetuate one's pre-existing self-view. Hence, such processing would inherently 
serve a seif-verification motive. Whether such processing not only satisfies but is actudy 
driven by self-verification motives, however, is not cleu. It is l e s  plausible that top-down 
processes would be dnven by a self-enhancement motive for pyticipmts in the context of the 
çurrent study. Given that the positive feedback was expiicitly tailored to be in a domain in 
which specific self-views were negative, domain-specific to p-down processing would fail to 
successfuily satise such motives. Self-enhancement motives could be met via n global top- 
down proces! in the çurrent study, but only for HSE, and not LSE, participants. However, 
even in this case, it would again be unclear whether such processing not only serves but is 
actually driven by seif-enhancement motives. 
Both bottom-up and top-down processes may represent unmotivated processes, 
because much of human cognitive processing occurs at f&ly automatic hvek (e.g., Bargh, 
1982; Epstein, in press; Gilbert, Giesler, & MQIT~S, 1995; Higgins, 1987). A bbmotivated" 
seif-verification theory impiies that LSEs do not improve their seif-views d e r  positive 
feedback because at some level they do not want to. A more purely cognitive view implies that 
LSEs are simply not able to improve their self-views because of the nature of their information 
processing, regardless of whether they wmt to. Unfortunately, it is very difncult to empincdly 
examine the motivations that underlie the processing of self-relevant feedback, md to tease 
them apYt fkom unbiased cognitive processes (di. Biaine & Crocker, 1993), and the current 
resevch did not attempt to do so. 
Self-Esteem and Bottom-UD venus Too-Down Processing 
The four perspectives we have identified lead to dinerent expianittions for potenta 
differences between LSEs and HSEs in their responses to feedback The context of the current 
study &wed us to focus on certain possibie exphations while ruling out others. We gave 
HSE and LSE participants feedback thnt they were high on a trait they hiid identified 3s part of 
their Ided-.selves (therehre, s desirable but self-diwrepant trait), and we ensured the feedback 
was equdiy seif-disçrepant for the two groups by matching them o n  their pretest self-ntings 
on the traits. Either bottorn-up or top-down processing could operate in this context, and we 
did not favour either as being more iikely to guide the processing of feedback. However, we 
did make predictions as to which type of bottorn-up pmcessing would be most iikely to 
operate and which type of top-down processing would be rnost likely to operate. 
Bottom-uo ~redictions. The two perspectives incorporating bottom-up processes 
suggest that the degree tci which people accept feedback is dependent on the amount of 
evidence that they can recruit to support it; if people c m o t  access enough memones to 
substantiate positive self-relevant feed back, the y wiU no t accept and incorporate that feedback 
into their self-concepts. If the objective bottom-up perspective is me, and people recruit and 
evaluate evidence in an unbiased fishion, HSE and LSE participants in our study would 
presumably recniit equd mounts of evidence to support the positive feedback, because they 
were equd in their initiai beliefs of how much they possessed the traits. Hence. they would 
accept (or, more likely, reject) the feedback to an equal extent. Therefore, ifour hunch wiis 
correct that HSEs would açcept the positive feedback to û greoter extent than LSEs, any 
bottom-up process would have to be biased. The evidence sevches would have to have 
different outcornes for LSEs md HSEs if they reach different çonclusionï.; specificdy, LSEs 
must £ïnd less evidence to support the positive feedback than HSEs. 
A b k d  evidence sevch that would lead LSEs to tind less supportive evidence thm 
HSEs could corne about thmugh several routes. However, one route that it çould not involve 
is the motive to self-ver@ specific seif-beliefs in the domain of feedback. n i r i t  motive would 
lead both HSEs and LSEs to search for evidence to disconfirm the feedback, and hence reject 
it, because the feedback ccrncemed a trait that both initially felt they did not possess. If a self- 
venfication motive w u  invcilved, it would have to be the motive to verQ global self-esteem. 
HSEs would be bksed to fuid evidence to support the feedback, and hence to accept it, 
whereas LSEs would be b k d  to find evidence to disconfimi the feedback, and hence to repct 
it. 
Another route toward the same birised search could even involve self-enhancement 
motives. if both HSEs and LSEs strive to self-enhance, they would be biased to h d  evidence 
to support the positive feed back. Moreover, given theû initidy equivalent self-views, the 
"reality constnints7' (cf. Syiitioso et al., 1990) ümiting such a b i s  would be equal for both 
groups. However, we believed that LSEs may k les adept thui HSEs at conducting a biased 
sevch for supportive evidence. As Brown (1993b) points out, most Life events are mbiguous 
and cm be interpreted in many ways, and HSEs appear to be more adept at identifjing and 
adopting interpretations that are conducive to feelings of self-worth. In çonuast, although 
LSEs value outcomes that build their self-esteem, they have low expectations that they are 
capable of producing such outcomes (Brockner, Wiesenfeld, & Raskas, 1993). LSEs have 
been characterized as "the Little engine thtlt cm but won't," because they tend to underestimate 
their capabilities (Heatherton & Ambady, 1993). Just as HSEs use a vviety of seIf-serving 
stntegies after failure, whereas LSEs tend to be even-hmded or even self-depreciating (e-g., 
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Brown & Mankowski, 1993)- HSEs may be more able to recruit and 
interpret p s t  experiences as supportive of positive feedback, whereas LSEs may be 
hmdicapped in such efforts. Thus, either a motive to self-verify global seif-views or a self- 
enhancement striving that LSEs are simply less adept at satidjhg, could give rise to b b d  
bottom-up evidence .wuch processes that would lead HSEs to accept positive feedback to ri 
greater extent than LSEs. 
Top-dawn predictions. Top-down perspectives focus on self-views rather than 
evidence sevches as the key to understanding how HSEs and LSEs draw conclusions about 
positive feedback. In our study, because HSE and LSE participants were matched on the 
positivity of their self-views in the domain of feedback, they did not differ in their domah- 
specific self-beiiefs. Given that the feedback traits were put of participants' Idecil-selves (traits 
they wished to possess but did not think they did), the domain-specinc top-down perspective 
would predict that bboth LSEs and HSEs would reject the feedback, and to an equd extent. 
Thus, again, if our prediction was correct that HSEs would accept the feedback to a greater 
extent than LSEs, my top-down intluences in this context must corne fiom global self-esteem. 
This g lo bal to p-do wn perspective would predict t hat LSEs' rehtively negative self-concepts 
would leed them to draw negative conclusions about the feedback, whereas HSEs' mon 
positive self-concepts wo uld d o  w them to draw positive conclusions about the feedback. 
Therefore. we expected that, if a top-down process guides the processing of feedback, it wodd 
operate in accordmce with the global top-down perspective: HSEs wodd accept the feedback 
to a greater degree thm LSEs despite king matched on their domain-specific self-views. 
To summuize, the cumnt study evduated whether the processing of self-relevant 
feedback is guided by primaiily top-down or bottom-up innuences, in hopes of coming to a 
bettes undesstanding of why LSEs may be l e s  able than HSEs to xcept and benefit fiom 
positive feedback. We predicted that if a bottom-up process opentes. it would do so in 
accordmce with a " b k d  bottom-up" perspective. LSEs would be l e s  able to accept positive 
feedback because they would h d  less evidence to support it thm HSEs. Ifa top-down 
proçess operates, we favoured a bbgbb;il'T topdown perspective, and predicted that LSEs 
would not accept positive feedback to the same extent as HSEs because their poor self- 
concepts would not permit them to. 
Previous Studies 
Our prior research in this area strongly infiuenced the design of the present study. In 
previous studies, we have focused exclusiveiy on the evidence seuch phase of responses to 
positive feedback. For exmple, in one recent study, we compared the ability of HSEs and 
LSEs to recruit memories in support of Ideal and Actuai-seif traits after receiving feedback on 
one of these dimensions (MacLeod & Wood, 1997). This study used a two-study paradigm 
(modeled after that used by Syiitioso et al, 1990) in which female participants first received 
bogus feedback that  the^ were high on a trait they had identined in pre-testing 3s part of either 
their Ided or Actual-selves. In a suppasedly sepante study, they were then asked to recruit 
rnemories relevant to their standing on an Ided-self tnit  and an Actud-self trait (order was 
counterb~ced) ,  agin drawn fro rn their pre-testing self-descrip tiens- thus, one of these traits 
matched the feedback domain. After Ming rnemories. participants rated each one for the 
degree to which it supported their possession of the trait. 
These memory ntings were mdyzed as the dependent memure to test our prediction 
(among others) that LSEs would h d  l e s  support for their Ideai-self traits than would HSEs. 
However, fZndings revealed a cornplex and difncdt to interpret four-way interaction of slf- 
esteem feedback, the type of trait (Ided or Actud), and the order in which the memory task 
was presented (recdüng memories for Ideal-self mit  6rst or Actual-self trait €irst}- 
Furthemore, an important confound emerged: Participants digered on the degree to which 
they felt they possessed their Ided-self traits at PR-teming. Specincdy, LSEs reported that 
they p«sse.ssed their Ideal-self traits to a lesser degree than did HSEs. When these pre-testing 
ratings were entered first into regression analyses, they predicted participants' memory ratings, 
and none of the other predictors were significant. Thus, this confound provided a very 
plausible alternative explanation for any self-esteem difTerences seen in the study. 
These findings influenced the design of the curent study in two main ways. First, the 
confound in our results clearly demonstrated the importance of controhg for participants' 
baseline perceptions of their standing on the feedback domab-that is, of equating the self- 
discrepancy of the feedback for HSEs and LSEs. Second, the complexity of the results, as weii 
as leading us  to consider possibilities other than bottom-up evidence seuches, also prompted 
us to explore a more direct and open-ended examination of how people think &er receiving 
positive feedback about themselves We elabonte on each of these issues below. 
The Current S t u d ~  
We examined our bottorn-up a d  top-down hypotheses by providing participants with a 
more spontmeous, open-ended response format than has been employed previously. Rather 
than administering feedback and then looking only at the outcornes of participants' thought 
processes, such as self-ratings on traits relevant to the feedback, we also anempted to tap into 
their thoughts via a 'Think-Aloud" procedure: Participants spoke doud into a tape recorder 
foiiowing the feedback mdpuiation. Would self-comparison processes be evident in their 
thoughts? Such processes may operate beyond awueness, so may not be expressed. We 
exrcmined whether participants considered bottom-up evidence such as memones of their 
previous experiences relevant to their Ideal-self trait, and whether participants engaged in top- 
down considerations of their slf-concepts. We &O ex;imined the positivity versus negativity 
of their thoughts-whether the evidence or the aspects of their seif-concepts they considered 
supported or refuted their possession of theû desired trait. B m d  on HSEs' tendency to use 
self-serving stmtegies more ofien than LSEs (e.g.. Blaine & Crocker, 1993), we predicted that 
HS Es would engage in more positive and self-serving thinking than LSEs. 
A cornparison group also engûged in a Think- Aloud procedure; they were asked to 
muse about m Ideabself trait without having received feedback on it. This unusual context 
dowed us to e x d e  the conditions under which a self-cornpuison process is triggered. 
Theorists who have posited seif-cornpuison processes have described them as a consequence 
of feedback (e.g., Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994; Esses, 1989; S w m  & Schroeder, 1995), but 
we wondered whether simply thinking about a self-discrepant tnit would be enough to trigger 
a seif-cornpuison process. Ided-self traits are iikely to figure prominently in people's thoughts 
in daily Me, and people rnay attempt to evaluate theû standing on them frequently. Hence, 
explicit feed back rnay no t be req uired to tngger self-cornpariso n. Furthemore, we wo ndered 
whether explicit feedback would have effects on thoughts, mood, and conclusions that differed 
from the effects of simply thinking about the trait. It is possible that HSEs do not require 
feedback to corne to believe they possess a desired trait; perhaps a self-cornpaison process k 
enough. 
The present study also used a more idiognphic approach to feedback manipulation 
than has often k e n  used in the put, as hûs been advocated (in theory) by a number of 
reseuchers (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Morling & Epstein, 1997; Pelhm, 1993b; Pelhvn & 
S w m ,  1989: Story, 1998). Our method of individuaily t a i i o ~ g  feedback ensured not oniy 
that feedback was truly self-discrepmt for each individual and equdy self-discrepant for HSEs 
and LSEs, but &o that it was in a domain of persond importance for d participants (ct: 
Higgins, 1987; Pelham & Swann, 1989). 
Method 
Pretest Phase 
Apprmimately one month before the beginning of the study. University of Waterloo 
(UW) undergraduates enroueci in an introductory psychology course çompleted a package of 
psychological mesures, for which they received extra credit towards their course grade. 
Included in this rnw testing package w u  the Self-Rating Scale (SRS; Fleming & Courtney, 
1984), a 36-item self-esteem mesure based on the Feelings of inadequacy Scale (Janis & 
Field, 1959). The SRS has ken  shown to have high reliabiiity, with r test-retest coefficient of 
.82 and intemal consistency (alpha) of .92 (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). Vrilidity data support 
its use as a mesure of globd self-esteem (Bkovich & Tornaka. 199 1 ). 
Also included in this package w u  a "Self-Description Questionnaire" (SDQ) modeled 
3fter one used by Eisenstadt and Leippe (1994). Students were given a List of 77 persondty 
traits. From this k t ,  they were asked to choose the five traits that best described their "Actual 
self," dehed as traits thnt "accurately describe how see yourself at the present tirne." The 
students were then asked to choose the five that best described their "Ideal-self," defîned as 
traits that %est describe how you would ideaiiy Lüce to be, but currentiy are not." After listing 
five traits for each of the Ideal and Actual selves, the students were asked to go back and give 
each of these 10 traits a rating on two scdes: a rating h m  i to 10 of how much they 
currently felt they possessed the trait, and 3 rating fiorn 1 to 10 of how important they 
considered the uait. On these scdes, "1" represented not possessing the traithot considering 
it important, and " 10" represented possessing the trait a greût dedkonsidering it very 
important. 
Participants and Desion 
Only students who scored in the top Yui bottom 30% of the SRS distribution were 
eligible to participate. Of the 54 participants recruited, 26 were considered to be LSE (M= 
1 1  1; range = 62 to 132), and 28 were considered to be HSE (u= 184; range = 166 to 226). 
Participants aLwi had ta have a trait on the SDQ that met our criteria for an "Ideal-seif" 
personality trait. Specifically, the trait had to have k e n  rated as a "6" or greoter in 
importance. and LS a "5" or l e s  on perceived degree of possessing the trait. Among 
participants who met these criteria, participants and traits were chosen such that HSE and LSE 
participants were matched for the degree to which they rated themselves as possessing the 
trait. Participants were not matched on their ratings of the importance of the trait. After 
cancehtions of two LSE participants, new matches were not found for the remahhg two 
HSE participants, resulting in the uneven number of LSE and HSE participants in the study. 
The mean age of participants was 19.7 yews, with a range from 18 to 37 yexs  To 
sirnplify the design of the study, only fernde participants were selected. Participants were 
recruited by telephone. They received extra credit towuds their course grade for participation. 
HSE and LSE participants were randomiy uigned to either an "Ideal-feedback" or a 
'no-feedback" condition. resulting in a two (HSE versus LSE) by two (Ided-feedback or no- 
feedback) experimental design. 
Procedure 
Participants were run t h u g h  the study individudy by one female experimenter. Upon 
mival at the hb, participants were seated at a table with a cornputer, and the experimenter 
expiained that research w u  king conducted on the 'Maxweil Personality hventorf' ("MPIi 
in tmth, ri bogus inventory), which w u  described to be a very rekble, valid, and widely-used 
personality inventory. Participants were told that nomative data were king coUected on LIW 
students' profiles on the MPI so that the personalities of students in difEerent faculties could be 
çompared. and thot n second airn of the study was to examine peoples' reactions to the 
inventory itself. The experirnenter explained that, after participants cornpleted the MPI on the 
cornputer, they would cornplete a "Think-Aloud" task and f2i out r number of questionnaires 
concerning their reactions to the task. Participants in the no-feedback condition were informed 
that due to the research nature of the setting, the resevcher was not pennitted to provide the 
participant's scores. Participants in the Ideal-feedback condition were infomed that due to 
tirne constraints and the detded nature of the MPI profiles* it would not be possible to give 
them their entire profiles, but that the cornputer would randomly select one subscde on which 
their score would be provided. 
The cornputer-dministered 'MPi" consisted of 60 questions requiMg tnie/false 
responses, presented one at a time. Upon completion of the Iûst item, participants in the Ideal- 
feedback condition saw a screen asking them to wait wwhile their score wm computed. After a 
few seconds' dehy, they were then given a bogus percentiie score, ostensibly on a ruidomly- 
chosen "subscde" of the inventory. In fact? each of these participants was told that they had 
scored in the 89th percentile on the personûlity tnit earlier chosen fiom theu 'ldeal-self' list. 
Next, di participants were told about an upcoming 'Sliink-Aloud" tsk. Participants in 
the Ided-feedback condition were told the task would focus on the personality trait they had 
just received feedback on; those in the no-feedback ccxiition were told that they had k e n  
randomly assigned a trait to focus on, and were then given what was in tmth the "Ideal-seif* 
trait evlier chosen for them. At this point, the experimenter ostensibly noticed that she had run 
out of copies of the materiais needed to pmçeed. She lefi the room, creating a four-minute 
delay designed to allow time for the feedback to "sink in" (cf. McGuîre & McGuire, 1996). 
Upon returning, the experimenter çompleted the instructions for the t u k .  
It w u  expiained that the Tm-Moud task would entd participants verbaiizing their 
thoughts into a tape recorder. The instructions for the task included an exphation that 
"We're interested in people's red-Me, personal reactions and thoughts about the persondty 
traits that the inventory gives feed back on," and that it had been found previously that people 
were able to give more spontaneous responses ordiy than in writing. Participants were 
encounged to avoid organiung or censoring their thoughts. The foliowing is an excerpt fiom 
the oral instructions that the experimenter gave: 
We'd k e  you to . . . muse and ponder about that trait, a d  my information you just 
got about yourseifon it, how it applies to you in your Life, and so on. As you're 
thinking, we'd Like you to sirnply say things out loud as you're thinking them. An 
important part of this Q that we wmt tto know about how people naturally think, so we 
don? wmt you to worry about . . . organizing or monitoring your thoughts - we just 
wuit you to "spit them out" as they corne to you . . .. 
Participants were wured that their responses wodd be entirely anonyrnous and confidentid 
The experimenter then pushed the record button on the tape recorder, and Ieft the room. 
Participants notified the experimenter when they had completed the mk. The t h e  spent on 
the task w u  left to the participant's discretion, and participants spent an average of five 
minutes "thinking aioud." When their narratives were hter u~iscribed, the average length of 
the t.rimsc15pt.s for di participants w u  22.3 lines of text (for HSEs, X = 2 1 .O, for LSEs, X = 
22.3). 
Foliowing the 'Think-AlouCi" tsk, a number of self-report measures were 
admhktered. The nrst was the Brief Mood Introspection Scde (BMIS; Mayer & Gachke, 
1988). s 16-item rnood mecisure bued cm the Mood-State Introspection Scde (MIS; Mayer, 
Mamberg, & Volanth, 1988). The BMIS has k e n  shown to have two independent factors: a 
Pleasant-Unpleuant dimension, and an Arousal-Calm dimension. These subscdes have been 
found to have moderately adequate to adequate reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .83 and 58 ,  
respectively), and goad factorid validity (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). In accordance with the 
author's recommendations (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; personai communication, 1997), a 7- 
point response scde WU used in place of the original Cpoint scaie in an attempt to improve 
the rehbility of the Arousd-Ch subscde. The original scde used the foilowing mchors at 
points 1 to 4, respectively: definitely do not feel; do not feel; slightly feel; definitely feeL 
These mchors were spaced 2 steps apwt in the madified format used in th& study. Intemal 
consistency of the Pleasant-Unpleasant scale was good in our simple, as in previous research 
(Cronbach's alpha = .8 1). However, internai consistency for the Amusai-Cab scaie remained 
only moderately good in our synple (Cronbach's alpha = S7). Subscde scores were 
computed for each participant on the two subscales; these subscdes were &O LYgely 
independent in our data, p -08, 52. 
Foiio wing the mood meassure, participants filled out a questionnaire that was designed 
to introduce an increased level of "prompting" in its inquiry into the nature and outcome of 
participants' 'bself-comparison'* processes, in co mparison to the kgely un- prompted Think- 
Aloud task. The questionnaire first iisked participants to make severai ratings on 10-point 
scales. In di c-s, "1" indicated the low end of the scde (e.g., do not po.sses tnit) and "LU' 
the high end (e.g., possess trait a _mat ded). The exact questions, in the order given, were as 
follo ws: 
(in Ided-feedback condition only) How weil does your score on the one subscde of 
the MPI "fit'' with your perception of your standing on that trait? 
Considering the trait that you were just thinkùig about, how much do you think you 
possess that trait at the current tirne? 
How certain do you feel of the nting you just gave of how much you possess that 
uait? 
How important to you is the trait ycm have just ken thinking about? 
Next, two questions h e d  to memure participants' "meta" level of awueness of perfoniiing 
the type of evidence sevch hypothesized by bottorn-up perspectives: 
When you were thinking about the uait and how it applies to you, did you h d  purseif 
thinking about ways in which you possessed the trait, times in the p s t  that you 
have demonstrated the trait, etc.? 
When you were thinking about the trait and how it applies to you, did you find yourself 
thinking rbout ways in which you did possess the trait, times in the past that 
you have demonstnted -f having the tnit, etc.? 
lfyou did thinkabout ways in wwhich you possessed the trait, how difncult was it to 
think of times that you demonstrated it in some way? 
FoIiowing these questions w u  an open-ended question that asked participants to think rbout 
specific, concrete evidence relevant to how much of the trait they felt they possessed, and to 
k t  examples of such behaviour or evenü. These exunples were hted in point fom. 
Upon completion of these measures, participants were probed for suspicion before they 
reiilized that the experiment was over, foiiowhg procedures suggested by Aronson and 
C~ismith (1968). Aithough it was not uncornmon for participants in the Ided-feedback 
condition to express surprise at their "scores" on the MPI. no participant expresseci doubt 
about the veracity of the feedback. Those participants who maintained that the feedback did 
not seem accurate t« them conïidered other exphnations for the inaccuracy (e-g., something 
about how they had answered the questions), and did not indicate m y  suspicion that the 
feedback might be bogus. The debriefing that fobwed this included a "process debriefing" 
(Rosq, Lepper, & Hubbwd, 1975), which emphasized the importance of understanding the 
fdse nature of the feedback. Participants agreed not to discuss the experiment with other 
potential participmts, were thanked for their participation, and excused. 
ResuIts 
Participants' Mas'; test in^ Ratinns of Traits 
We examuied whether HSE and LSE participants were matched successfuliy on their 
mius testing ratings of how much they possessed the Ideal-self trait selected for them. As 
expected, a t-test indicated that the mean rating for HSEs (M = 3.93, & = 1.02) did not differ 
signincmtly f b m  the rnean rating for LSEs (M = 3.73, A = 1.00), ~ ( 5 2 )  = -.72, g = .48. 
Participants' mas testing ratings of how important the trait was were ÛIso exarnined. 
As described eulier, traits used in the study were ail nted as a 6 or higher in importance, but 
participants were not matched on this variable. A t-test indicated that at the tirne of mius 
testing, LSEs nted the traits as signifïcantly more important (M = 8.96) than did HSEs (M = 
7.82), i(52) = 3.27. e = .002. which may reflect HSEs' tendency to downphy the importance 
of attributes that they do not possess (Blûine & Crocker, 1993; Brown & Mankowski, 1993). 
To rule out the possibiüty that this pre-test dinerence might account for results found in the 
study, we included this variable as a covviate in all major mdyses reported below. Virtudy 
di effects that emerged remained the m e  regudiess of whether the covarhte w u  included; 
therefore, analyses without this covarinte are reported. The few instances in which inclusion of 
the covan;ite resulted in srnaii changes in the results will be indicated as they are reported. 
Acceptance of Ideal-Self Trait 
Next we examine our prediction that HSEs would be more iïkely than LSEs to accept 
the Ideal-feedback. Two rneasures adrninistered after the Think-Moud task address this 
prediction. First, participants in the Ided-feedback condition rated how weU the Ide& 
feedback "£it7' with their own perceptions of their standing on the tMit @ = 27). A t-test 
sup ported our prediction. revealing that HSEs nted their Ided-self tnit feedback as fitthg 
significantly better (M = 5.7 1 ) than did LSEs (M = 3.77). ~ ( 2 5 )  = -2.17, g = .04. Second, 
HSEs dso reported that they possessed the trait to a greater extent than LSEs. "Possess'* 
ntings were malyzed in a repeoted-mesures ANOVA with a repeated factor of t h e  ( m m  
testing or post-feedback manipulation), and between-subjects factors of seifesteem and 
feedback. Main effects of setf-esteem, E( 1,5O) = 6.4 1, g = .O 15. and tirne, F( 1,50) = 56.13, g < 
.O0 1, were qu;ilifed by a significmt interaction of tirne and self-esteem, F( 1.50) = 4.13, g = 
.048, which B presented in Table 1. Possess ntings were higher after the feedback 
manipulation than at mius testing for both HSEs ruid LSEs (F(l,26) = 45.74 and E(l,24) = 
14.85, respectively, in simple effects analyses, g <. .O0 1 for bo th), but this was especidiy so for 
HSEs. Simple effecü analyses indicated a main effect of self-esteem on possess ratings ;ifter 
the feedback manipulation, F( l,5O) = 6.63, g = .O 13. 
Table 1 
Mean "Possess" Ratings at T i e  of Mass Testinp: and In Lab as a Function of Self-Esteem 
Lo w Self-Esteem 
High Self-Esteem 
Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scde, with higher ratings indicating a higher degree of -
possession. 
Thus dthough HSEs and LSEs did not dEer in their possess ratings m mass testing, 
HSEs rated themselves as possessing the tn i t  signiflcantly more than did LSEs afier the 
feedback rnanipuiation. Notably. there were no effecü of feedback on possess ntings; 
participants came to beüeve that they were higher on their Ided-self traits thm they had 
previously thought whether they were told that they were or had merely mused aloud about 
thnt trtiit. and thLs was especidy tme of HSEs. However, as we wili describe, feedback did 
have effects on other memures. 
'Think- A h  ud" Responses 
Ho w did participants reach these conclusions concerning their standing on their Ideai- 
self traits? We now examine participants' tape-recorded responses to the Think-Aloud ta&, 
which were transcribed verbatim. These transcnpts were coded by two independent coders, 
blind to self-esteem of participants. As f u  as possible, coders also were blind to feedback 
condition. However, many participants in the Ideai-feedback condition made specific reference 
to their scores h m  the "MPI," thereby reveaüng their condition. Responses were coded for 
Vistances of the categories üsted below. A number of other categories were initiaiiy included, 
but were removed as a result of non- or m e  occurrence. To examine inter-nter agreement, 
we correhted the two coders' frequencies for each category on a random smple of 14 
participants (25.9%). ' These correktions were typicdy quite high, and are reported in 
parentheses for each category below. Means and standard deviations for each category, as 
well as the intercorrelations of the categories, are presented in Appendix A. 
A number of the categories reflected the types of thoughts one would expect to see 
h m  perspectives incorporating a "bo ttom-up" component, because the y involved 
considention of various types of evidence relevant to participants' standing on the trait. 
Previous Ex~enence "For" the Trait: Any reference to previous specific or geneal life 
experiences that indicate possession of the Ideal-self trait in question. (r = -79) (e.g., 
[uait in question is "bold'7 "Pretty wel any situation if there's something to be said, 1 
wiU say it.") 
Previous Experience "Arrillnst" the Trait: S m e  as rbove, but indicating the absence of the 
trait, or arguing ag;ùnst p«s.session of the trait. = .79) 
Social Cornparison: Any socid cornparison made, either to a specinc other or to others in 
generd; coded as "U~ward/nen;ttive " or "Downward/~ositive. " (for 4'Upwud," = 
.90, for "Downward," : = 1.0) (e-g., 'Viey just seem to be more outgoing to me than 
what 1 am, I didn't think I was as outgoing as they were" (upward)) 
Feedback From Others about the Trait: Any mention of feedback or comments received ftom 
others with respect to the Ided-self trait; coded as "Positive" or "Nenative." (both p = 
1.0) (e.g., "rnaybe I ;un a bit warm, . . . I've had people tell me that") 
Comoariïon With the Prototwe: Any cornparison made of the self to a previously described 
pro to typdtypicd perso n possessing the trait. Origindly categories were included for 
both upwvd and downwvd compukons. However, as oniy one participant made n 
downwvd cornparison with a prototype, it was dropped and only the "U~ward" 
çategory wns included in analyses. (r = 1 .O) 
Other categories were relevant to the more "top-down" perspectives, because they 
refiected considerations of various aspects of participants' elf-views. It k notable that 
participants tended to tie their self-concept refiections to specific traits. nther thm to make 
statements about their global self-esteem or seif-worth. 
Self-Conce~t on Trait - "For": Any statement indicating a belief that she (the participant) 
possessas the Ideal-seif trait. (r = -84) (e.g., ' h ,  1 believe I'm a fairly self-confident 
perso n") 
Self-Conceot on Trait - 'Against": Any statement indicating beiief that she does not possess 
the Ided-self mit. (r = -94) (e-g., "1 never rediy think of myself as king that 
confident") 
Self-Conce~t on Related Trait: A n y  statement of self-concept with respect to a trait reiated to 
(but n«t the same as) the Ideal-self trait; coded as "Positive" or "Nerrative. " (for 
"Positive," l =  .98, for "Negative," !: = .68) 
Descn~tion of Change: Any reference to change in the mount of the trait she feek she 
possesses; origindy coded as positive (describing increasing possession of the trait) or 
negative. Ho wever, because only one participant described a negative change (decrease 
in mount of the trait possessed), the negative category was dropped. & = 1 .O) (e-g., 
"'Ever since I got inta a senous rehtionship . . . 1 think I've become a lot more social, 
outgoing") 
Reflected Appraisd: Any reference to how she thhkshelieves others see her; Le., her 
perceptions of how others see her with respect to the trait or a rehted trait (as opposed 
to actud feedback received &om o thers); coded as "Positive " or "Neizative." (bath gs 
= .68) (e.g., ". . . 1 might be perceived as more cold than w m  .. .") We considered 
this citegory to be relevant to top-down perspectives because rehcted r i p p r W  tend to 
be projections of people's own self-views rather than accunte perceptions of how others 
see them (Felson, 1989; Jussim et A, 1992; Shrauger & Schoenemm, 1979; Story, 
1998). 
F i d i y ,  i number of other categories were not anticipated by our interest in bottom-up 
md top-down perspectives, but simply ernerged fiom the data. 
hn~ortmceNdue of Trait: Any reference to or evduation of the importance or value of the 
Ideai-sef trait; coded as "Positive" (indicnting thac the trait is seen as important or 
valuable) or "Neeative " (indicûting that the vait is seen as unimportant or of negative 
vdue). (1 = -93 and = .W. respectively) (e.g., [after naming trait] "I feel it piays yi 
important role in everyday iife basicdy") 
Extemai Exdanation for Feedback: (relevant to participants in Ided-feedback condition) Any 
reference to an explanation for the score received on the "MPi" that dmws on sources 
extemal to the degree to which they possess the trait. (r = 1 .O) (e.g., ". . . 1 wished there 
wrr~ a middle way for the questions insted of it king frue or fdse, because some of the 
questions were a bit puzzling to me; I guess that's why 1 received such a high 
percentage") 
Association with Others who Possess Trait: Any reference to or description of others with 
whom she is closely assochted who possess the trait. Cr = 1.0) (e.g., "[name], my 
fiend, she was r great non-conformist") 
Chmcteristics of Prototye: Any mention of positive or negative characteristics as part of a 
"prototype" of the tnit or someone who possesses the trait; each "characteristic" coded 
as "Positive " or ''Ne~ative. " (r = .98 and g = -68, respectively) (e-g., ''Comphentuy 
people are very nice people. they Like to make people feel good about themselves, . . . 
they're not rude to others, they don't brag about themselves") 
Subt-winn Tnit: Any clear reference to or description of specifïc subtypes (usuaiiy two) of the 
trait. (e-g., 'Tm probably a non-conformist more in my uh ambitions and go& thui the 
way 1 appear or speak or act to other people . . ." [goes on to ehbonte "mentai" versus 
"socid" non-conformists]) Such instances originally were coded as either "self-serving" 
or "self-defeaùng" based on the apparent outcome of the subtyping for the participmt7s 
view of self. However, because ody one participant received a code for bbseif-defeating" 
subtyping, this category was dmpped. @ = 1 .O) 
Importance of Subty~e: Any statement(s) assening the greater vdudimportuice of one of the 
previously Jefined subtypes over another. Origindy these were to be coded as either 
'Wf-defeating" or 'b.seif-.serving," but the self-defeating çategory was never observed, so 
w u  dropped. The "self-serving" category was seen in the responses for 3 participants; 
agreement between coders for these three occurrences w s  perfect. 
No Self-Reference: A code w u  given for any participant who made no specific reference to 
herself throughout her entire response. Agreement between coders for this category was 
perfect. 
In addition to th coding of "counts" for various çategories, the Think-Aloud 
responses dso were nted by both coders on five more globai, impressionistic dimensions. 
Each participant was given a score ftorn 1 tu 5 on each of the mies  Listed bebw. Again, 
correlations between raters were computed for a random smple of 14 (25.9%) of the 
pyticipanü. and are reported in parentheses below. 
Positivitv: A rating for how positive the puticipmt's attitudelfeelings towvd herseIf seemed 
to be. Rated as verv neeative ( 1) to verv ~ositive (5). = .76) 
Acce~tmce of Tnit: An o v e d  rating of how much the pYiicipûnt seemed to accept that she 
possessed the trait. Rated as not at di (1) to com~letelv (5). (L = 33) 
CIYit~lWavering. or Coherence: A global nting of ho w clex and coherent the participant 
seemed on her self-concept with respect to the trait, as opposed to how much she 
"wavered" about whether she possessed the trait. Rated ~IS verv unclear (wavered a great 
deai, etc.) ( 1) to cornoleteh clex md certain (5).  (r = 39) 
Positivit~ of Prototwe: Thk scde was rated only for participants who had described a 
prototype of the trait in question. An overdi ntîng of how positive the pmtotype was. 
Rated as very nenative ( 1 ) to verv positive, to the point of king "perlect" or unattainable 
(5). (L = 1.0) 
Self-ServindSelf-Defeating: An ovedi rating of how seIf-serving versus self-defeating the 
participant was in her thinking about the trait. Rated as  vervseif-defeatùig (1) to ven, 
self-serving (5). = .8 1 ) 
Analyses of "Think-Aloud" Responses 
Perspectives incorporating a "bottom-up" component predicted that participants would 
examine specific "evidence" with respect to their Ided-self trilit. if they did so, we predicted 
that LSEs would corne up with less evidence to support their vait thm wouid HSEs. The 
"global to p-do wn" perspective predicted thû* pYticipants would be infîuenced by their overd 
self-concepts and self-esteem. if this was true, HSEs may make more positive statements 
about their seif-esteem and self-concepts than LSEs. To explore these questions and 
hypotheses. we e x b e d  conceptuai groupings of the coding categories to a d d m  the 
bo ttom-op and top-do wn perspectives. 
When combining individuai categories into groupings to examine our hypotheses, we 
did not take the traditionai îlppmach of using factor malysis to identay clusters of covarying 
cûtegories2. We did not believe that individuals who have one type of thought &O necessdy 
have other thoughts within that grouping, as a factor analytic approach assumes. For exmple, 
individuals may d8er  in the type of evidence they consider with respect to a mit, with some 
people focusing on social comparksons and others focusing on feedback fiom others. Instead. 
we grouped categories bûsed on their apparent fùnctiond equivdence fiom a conceptual basis, 
. * 
because that w u  more appropriate to our questions. Out interest was in ex;iminuig the effects 
of engaging in any type of thought or combination of thoughts within each grouping-for 
example. the effects of cons ide~g any of a vviety of f o m  of evidence with respect to the 
trait. This rppmach k consistent with that advocated by Bollen and L e ~ o x  ( 199 1) for 
situations in which the conïtruct to be studied is the emergent product of the specific 
components king meûsured. rather than the underlying cause of each component. For such 
comtmcts, the indicators of the construct should not necessariiy be expected to dispiay intemal 
ccimistency. Other researchers ais0 have taken a similar approach (e.g., Woody, Drugovic, & 
Oakmrui, 1997). 
Thus we formed three conceptual groupings fiom the individuai coding categories: (1) 
ccimideration of specific "evidence" with respect to the trait, (2) considention of aspects of 
one's self-concept, and (3) atternpts to define the trait. We examine the groupings one by 
3 one . 
Specific evidence. The k s t  conceptuai grouphg addresses the bottom-up view that 
people consider specific evidence fkom their p s t  experiences when they evduate whether they 
possess r trait. Consistent with this perspective, participants did consider severai types of 
evidence with respect to their standing on their Ided-self trait: previous experiences with 
respect to the trait (positive or negative), feedback received nom others with respect to their 
standing on the trait (positive or negative), and compuisons of themselves with others 
(positive or negative), or with a prototype of the tnit (negative oniy). We sumrned these 
categories to fom two composite scores reflecting the mount of positive and negative 
evidence, respectively, that participiuits considered, and entered them into n repeated-mesures 
ANOVA, with a repeated factor of positivefnegative and between-subjects factors of seif- 
esteem (high or low) and feedback (none or Ideai). A main effect of the repeated factor, 
F( 1.50) = 4.80, g = .033, indicated that ail participants considered more negative (M = 2.07) -
than positive (M = 1.54) evidence with respect to their Ideal-self traits. This result makes 
sense, becouse participants had identifed the Ideal-.self uait as one they did not possess; 
hence, their p u t  experiences and feedback should dispute their possession of the trait, nther 
thm support it. There were no other significant effects. Thus, consistent with perspectives 
incorporating bottom-up processes, participants did consider evidence with respect to their 
standing on the Ided-self trait. However, contrary to our prediction, LSEs did not gmer Iess 
evidence to support possession of their Ideal-self traits thm did USES 
Domain-related seif-concept. If HSEs and LSEs did not dBer in the specific evidence 
that they considered for their Ided-selfuaits, did they diner in their considerations of their 
self-concepts, as top-down perspectives would predict? The answer k yes. Although 
participants did not make direct statements about their overalî levels of self-esteem. they did 
express thoughts about various aspects of theû self-concepts. The categones summed in this 
second conceptuai grouping were: self-concept on trait, self-concept on rehted trait, 
"re fiected ap pnisals" (di positivehegative), and positive c hmge (positive). Again, positive 
and negative composite scores were formed by sum-g these categories, and were analyzed 
in a repeated-mesures ANOVA with a repeated factor of positivehegative and between- 
subjects factors of self-esteem and feedback On this "domain-related self-concept" composite, 
a significant interaction of self-esteem and positivehegative emerged, E(l,50) = 4.38, g = .041. 
Means are presented in Table 2. To examine simple effects, we ran sepmte repeated- 
mewures ANOVAs for each self-esteem gmup (Howell, 1997). Consistent with top-down 
perspectives, these mdyses indicated that LSEs made more negative than positive statements 
about their self-concepts in domains rehted to their Ideal-self traits, E( 1 ,U) = 8.04, g = -009. 
However, rather than showing the reverse tendency, HSEs made simk numbers of positive 
and negative statements about their seif-concepts, _F < 1. Exmination of the means presented 
in Table 2 suggests thrt HSEs made somewhat more positive comments about their self- 
concepts than LSEs, and LSEs made somewhat more negative comments than HSEs. 
However, follow up malyses hdicated that these diffierences were not signincmt. A main 
effect of feedback also emerged in the overd maiysis, E(1,50) = 5.85, g = .O 19, such that 
participants made more statements concerning their seif-concepts after Ideal-feedback (M = 
Table 2 
Mean Positive and Negative "Domain-Related Self-Conce~t" Com~osite Scores as a Function 
of Self-Esteem 
Positive Negative 
Lo w Self-Esteem 
High Self-Esteem 
Note. Values in table refiect mem number of self-concept statements made. -
Trait de finition. nie third conceptual grouping of categories invo lved apparent 
attempts to define or consider the m e d g  of the trait in question. We did not have my 
predictions for these types of thoughts. Again, we formed composite scores to reflect the 
m o  unt of positive and negative "defining" tho ughts by surnming the folIo wing categories: 
chuacteristics of the prototype (positivefnegative), importance of the trait (positivefnegative), 
and subtyping (positive). These composite scores were mdyzed in a repeated-mesures 
ANOVA identic3 to that used for the previous composites. Signifiicmt main effects of 
feedback, E( 1-50) = 17.0 L. g < -00 1, and positivefnegative, E( 1,50) = 33.94. g < -00 1, were 
qualified by a significmt interaction of feedback and positivehegative, E( 1,50) = 10.47, e = 
.002. Most thoughts that participants had about the "definition" of the tnit were positive 
ones. This is not surprising, given thnt the trait was one they considered to be highly desirable. 
However, this was especidy me in the no-feedback condition, in which participants showed û. 
particularly large number of positive "dennition" thoughts (M = 4.26; in Ideal-feedback 
condition, kJ = 1.30; for negative thoughts: in no-feedback condition, M = 0.52; in Ided- 
feedback condition, M = 0.22). There were no effects of self-esteem. 
Global ratines. Findly, each of the five global ratings made by the coders wûs ~ i a l y z e d  
in an ANOVA with the between-subject variables of self-esteem and feedback. We expected 
that HSEs wouid be rated as more positive and self-serving in their thinking than LSEs, and 
that they would be rated as accepting possession of the trait to a greater extent than LSEs. 
Ratings could no t be made for eight participants who made no reference to themselves in their 
Think-Aioud task (3 were LSE and 5 were HSE; 1 was in the [deal-feedback and 7 were in 
the no-feedback conditions). As a result, fi = 46 for most of these analyses. The predictions 
were supported by main effects of self-esteem on ratings of how positive the participant was 
about herself, E(1,42) = 10.18, g = .003, how seIf-serving versus self-defkating her rhinking 
was F(1,42) = 7.75, e = .008. and the extent to which she accepted possession of the trait 
F( 1,42) = 4.66, g = -037~. HSEs were rated as more positive about themselves, more self- -
serving in their thinking. and more accepting of the trait than were LSEs. No other effects 
were seen. There were no effects of self-esteem or feedback on global mtings of the cluity 
and coherence of participants' thinking about their Ideal-self trait, or on global mtings of the 
positivity of my prototypes described (for the iatter analysis, = 23, because oniy 23 of the 
participants described a prototype). 
Surnmw of Think-Aioud Data 
Self-esteem dserences. How did HSEs and LSEs d8er in their spontaneous thinking 
about their Ided-self traits? As predicted, HSEs were rated as accepting possession of their 
Ideal-self vaits to a greater extent than LSEs. Somewhat consistent with perspectives positing 
that people use bottom-up processes, participants did consider specific evidence with respect 
to their ideai-self traits, in the fom of various relevant previous experiences. However, 
contmry to our predictions, LSEs did not d8er h m  HSEs in the mount or positivity of 
evidence that they considered: Both HSEs and LSEs considered more negative thui positive 
evidence with respect to the traits. Instead, consistent with top-down perspectives, the two 
groups differed on their thoughts aba ut their self-concepts. Participants expressed these 
thoughts as statements about various specfic aspects of their self-views nther thm as direct 
comments on their overd leveis of self-esteem. LSEs made more negative thm positive 
references to their domain-reiated ~e~concepts .  However, nther than m&g predominuitly 
positive references to their self-concepts, HSEs made a s i m .  number of positive and negative 
references to their seif-concepts. In addition, coders rated HSEs as more positive and self- 
serving in the ir thinking than LSEs. 
Feedback digerences. We ;ils0 explored whether receiving explicit feedback on Ided- 
self traits prompted different thoughts than sirnply considering such traits and verbalizing one's 
thoughts. Overail, participants were more Iîkely to make reference to themselves after Ided- 
self feedback than dter no-feedback (no t reported e u k r ,  E( 150) = 5.72, p = -02 1). The 
content of participants' thoughts &O differed between the feedback conditions. Participants 
made more comments conceming their self-concepts after Ideûl-feedback than dter no- 
feedback, and expressed fewer thoughts rehted to denning the uait (rhis interacted with the 
tendency to express more positive than negative thougho about the trilit's definition). Thus, 
w hen in a relatively "ne utrûl" context (atier no-feed back), participants pondered the meaning 
and importance of the trait in generd, perhaps because they had nnthing better to do. When 
the task was more self-relevant--der receiving feedback on their Ideal-self trait--participants 
seem to have abandoned sorne of these more abstnct thoughts in favour of considering thek 
own seif-concepts. Although it seerns common-sensicd that people are more likely to think 
about thernselves after receiving seif-relevant feedback, this 6nding supports arguments that 
feedback particululy uiggers a self-cornpaison process (e.g., Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994; 
Esses, 1 Hg), because participants thought more about themselves after receiving feedback on 
a trait than when simply musing about the trait. 
Next we examine the mecsures that were administered fobwing the Think-Aloud t sk .  
Mood -
We were uncertain 3~ to whether our Ideai-feedback condition would improve 
participants' moods. Typicdy, mood mesures are not reported in feedback studies. When 
they are, traditionai "success" feedback manipuhtions sometimes increase positive mood, but 
often they do not (e.g., M m y ,  Holrnes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, in press; Wood et al., 
1994, Study 1). In addition, we delivered feedback that was more self-discrepûnt than hm 
been the case in most p s t  research: We informed participants that they possessed traits that 
they had indicated that they did not possess. Participants may have been somewhat ssurprised 
by such feedback, and hence did not did not feel good about it immediateiy. Indeed, our 
results indicated that the moads of participants who received ideal-feedback were not better 
than those of participants who received no-feedback. However, consistent with p s t  resesicch, 
the moods of LSEs and HSEs were not differentdiy affected by positive feedback, as we 

Again. there were no effects of feedback. Thus, an interesthg pattern emerged in the possess 
and importance ratings: At mas testing, when matched on possess ratings, LSEs and HSEs 
differed in their importance ntings; after the feedback manipulation, LSEs and HSEs did diner 
in possess ratings, but they no longer dEered in their importance ratings. 
Table 3 
Mean "Irn~on;ince" Ratines at Time of Mas Testing and In Lab as a Function of Self-Esteem 
Mass Test hg  Ln Lab 
Lo w Self-Esteem 
High Self-Esteem 
Note. Ratings were made on a IO-point scde, with higher ratings indicating greater -
importance. 
Relation of Possess Ratinns to Think-Moud Data 
The bottom-up and top-down perspectives not only led to predictions about the 
content of p;inicipmts7 thoughts after receiving feedback and their conclusions about the 
feedback; they also led to predictions about the relation between tho.se thoughts and people's 
acceptmce of the feedback. The bottom-up perspectives predicted that the amount of 
evidence participants produced to support their Ided-self traits would determine the degree to 
which they would accept possession of the traits. The top-dom perspective predicted that 
participants' globd self-esteem and thoughts rebted to their self-concepts would detemine the 
degree to which they wouid accept possession of the traits. 
To examine these predictions, we regressed possess mtïngs on seif-esteem, feedback 
(both dicho tornous variables), and the six intermediate composites h m  the Think-Moud data 
(positive and negative "evidence," "domain-rehted self-concepf" and bbdefinition" 
comp«sites). Self-esteem and feedback were entered on the first step of the regression. 
Together, these two variables accounted for 12% of the variance in possess ratings, F = 3.44, 
=.040. However, only self-esteem was a significant predictor of the possess ntings (P = 1.37, 
p = .O 12). The six composites were entered on a second step, and resulted in a significmt 
increase in the mount of variance in possess ntings accounted for (change in R~ = .36, F = 
5.08, g = .002); together, the variables entered in the first and second steps accounted for 
47% of the variance in possess ratings, F = 5.09, g < .O0 1. However, of the six composites, 
only the two domain-rehted self-concept composites were significmt predictors of the possess 
ratings (for positive self-concept, P = .48, = .022; for negative self-concept, P = 4 4 ,  g < 
.O0 1 ). 
Thus, these hdings are more supportive of a top-down than a bottom-up process: 
Participants' seif-esteem and thoughts about their domain-rehted self-concepts, but not the 
mount of evidence they recruited, predicted their hter ratings of the degree to which they 
possessed their Ided-self trait. The "dennition" composite &O was not a signincant predictor. 
Seff-esteem remained margindy signifiant in predicting possess ntings in this second step (P 
= -86, g = .070). nie two-way interactions between di of the predicton were entered on the 
third step of the regression, but they did not predict possess d g s  beyond the contribution of 
the varüibles on their own (change in R~ = .26, F = -60, g = -887). 
"Search" Ratings 
In addition to exploring the outcorne of participants' evidence seuches, we also 
investigated the3 subjective experiences of semhhg for evidence. Because seif-cornpuison 
may mcur at an automatic level (cf. Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994). it is possible that participants 
rnay not be entirely aware of suçh processes. We found that dthough both LSEs and HSEs 
had produced more negative thm positive evidence during the Think-Aloud task (as reported 
eariier), the two gmups h d  different perceptions of their searches. Participants' ntings of the 
extent to which they had searched for positive and negotive evidence for their Ideal-self trait 
were mdyzed as a repeated-rneasures factor in an ANOVA with between-subjects factors of 
self-esteem and feedback. A signiticant interaction of positivehegative and self-esteem, E(1, 
50) = 4.99, p = .030, indicated that HSEs reported doing more "positive seuch" thm 
"negative seuch," whereas LSEs reported doing more "negative" than "positive seuch." A 
muginally significant 3-way interaction of positivehegative, self-esteem, and feedback aLso 
emerged, E(1,50) = 3.38, g = .072, and is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 









Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scde, with higher rathgs indicating n greater mount -
of perceived search. 
" Mean cohpsed over Feedback conditions 
Foiiow-up analyses to examine this interaction suggested that Ideal-feedback may have 
prompted LSEs to perform extra negative search in cornpaison to no-feedback. To examine 
simple main and interaction effects, we ran sepmte repeated-measures ANOVAs for each self- 
esteem group (Howeii, 1997). For HSEs, this malysis reveaied a main effect of the repeated 
measure, FJ 1,26) = 5.40, e= .028, such that the HSEs rated thernselves as perfomiing more 
positive than negative search. For LSEs, there was a significant interaction of 
positivdnegative and feedback, FJ 1 , U )  = 5.41, g = .029, such that they reported that after no- 
feedback, they conducted slightly more positive thm negative semh, whereas d e r  Ideal- 
feedback, they conducted more negative than positive seuch. 
Furthemore, when LSEs did feel that they had conducted a search for positive 
evidence, they rated that search as more d ~ c u l t  than did HSEs. Participants who felt they hrid 
conducted n positive sevch were asked to rate how diffcult it had been to corne up with 
instances to support their Ideai-seif trait. Participants thus made their own decision concerning 
whether to respond to the question, resulting in g = 41 for responses to this item (19 of these 
were LSEs, 22 were HSEs). An ANOVA revealed a marginal main etiect of self-esteem, 
F(1,50) = 2.78, g = . 064', such that LSEs reported more difnculty in coming up with positive 
6 
evidence (M = 6.16) thm did USES (M = 4.64). Again, this is despite the fact that LSEs and 
HSEs descnbed equd mounts of positive evidence. There were no effects of feedback 
condition. 
Prom~ted Evidence Search 
Would the outcome of an "evidence seuch" be diftèrent if puticipmts were explicitly 
prompted to conduct the search and to report their tindings? Participants were asked to kt 
examples of past expenences relevant to how much they felt they posse.ssed theû Ided-self 
trait. Eûch of these examples were coded as king either "fior" (Le.. evidence in suppon of the 
trait) «r "against" (Le., evidence arguing against the trait) by coders b h d  to participants' self- 
esteem and feedback condition. For example. when the Ided-self trait under considention w u  
"self-confident," an instance coded as 'Yor" w u :  "[my] abiiity to speak up in class," and one 
çoded as "agaimt" was: "[Il do not tell people when 1 am upset with thern? Inter-rater 
reliability w u  computed for a sample of 20% of participants and wm shown to be very good, 
Kappa = .83. 
Totais of the number of pieces of evidence iisted "for" the trait and "against" the trait 
were entered as a repeated measures factor in the usud ANOVA. A main effect of the 
repeated factor emerged, f(1,50) = 205.74,g < .O0 1, such that participants iisted significantly 
more evidence 'Tor" their Ided-self traits (M = 4.04) than "against" them (M = 1.28). This is 
contrvy to the pattern seen on the "evidence" composite scores fiom the Think-Aloud task, 
where participants considered more negûtive than positive evidence. Again, as seen on the 
evidence composite, there were no effects of feedback or selfssteem. It appears, then. that 
feedback did not S e c t  participants' ability to recruit evidence in suppon of their Ideal-self 
trait, and that, even when both groups had been prompted to semh for evidence, LSEs were 
no l e s  able to recniit it than HSEs. 
Discussion 
In this research. we explored the self-cornparison processes that people engage in when 
thinking about desired traits and when responding to positive feedback about themselves. Ln 
contrast to the assumptions of previous researchers that LSEs and HSEs respond similarly to 
success and differ only in their reactions to failure (e.g., Brown, 1993b), we found that they 
responded difkrently. As we predicted, among participants who received positive feedback, 
HSEs accepted that feedback to a greater degree than did LSEs: They rated the feedback as 
fitting better with their views of themselves. HSEs also rated themselves as possessing their 
Ideai-self uaits to a greater extent than LSEs. These clifferences occurred even though we had 
created a situation in which there seemed to be no logical reason for the two groups to accept 
possession of their Ideal-self traits to different degrees, because the traits were equally self- 
discrepant for both HSEs and LSEs. To understand such puzziing reactions, we attempted to 
tap into the self-cornparison processes that theorists have posited but not defined ciearly (e.g., 
Eisenstadt & Lippe, 1994; Esses, 1989; Jussim et ai., 1995). We sought to determine 
whether conclusions about desired traits are ciriven by primady top-down or bottom up 
processes. 
TOD-Down and Bottom-UR Processes 
Consistent with the bottom-up view that one's conclusions about self-relevant traits are 
guided by inductive reasoning, participants in our study did examine evidence relevant to their 
standing on their Ideal-self traits. For example, they recalled their previous expenences and 
feedback they had received fkom others with respect to the trait. However, HSEs and LSEs 
did not dBer either on the amount of evidence or on the positivity of evidence they recniited, 
as we predâted they would. This result could be seen as consistent with an "objective" 
bottom-up model of self-cornparison, in that an objective evidence search would presumably 
have yielded equal amounts of supportive evidence for HSEs and LSEs, given that they had 
been equated on the degree to which the ideai-self traits were self-discrepant. However, if an 
objective bottom-up process had been at work, the two groups should have accepted 
possession of the traits to an equal extent, which was not the case. Moreover, the evidence 
participants considered did not predict their conclusions about the feedback, as  it should have 
ifeither an objective or a biased bottorn-up process had k e n  at work. 
instead, results were consistent with a top-down perspective, which suggests that 
processing of seif-relevant information is guided by deductive reasoning fiom pre-exkting seg 
views. Results supported this model in two ways. Fust, HSEs and LSEs differed in the 
thoughts they expressed about their self-concepts, in that HSEs expressed an equal number of 
positive and negative thoughts about their domain-related self-concepts, whereas LSEs 
expressed more negative than positive thoughts of this kind. Second, the positivity of these 
self-concept thoughts, as weil as their global levels of seif'steem, predicted participants' 
mtings of ho w much they possessed their Ideal-self traits. 
How did this top-down influence operate? The domain-specinc top-dom perspective 
cannot account for the difference between HSEs and LSEs because we equated the two groups 
on their self-views specific to the domain of self-evduation Hence, any dinenntial to p-down 
innuence in our study must have corne fiom global self-esteem. Our fïndings are consistent 
with Shrauger (Shrauger & Rosenberg, L970; Shnuger & Kelly, 1988) and Story's (1998) 
fhdings that global seksteem can influence processing of information independent of specinc 
self-beliefs. The influence of global self-esteem, ho wever, was not explicit in the Think-Aloud 
task. Participants rarely made staternents about their overail self-concepts (e-g., 'Tm not a 
very good person" or "I'm a lovable person"). Instead, their comments about their self- 
concepts tended to be tied to various more specific aspects of their self-concepts (e.g., '9 
believe I'm a fairly self-confident person"). This discrepancy between explicit Think Aloud 
responses and our conclusion that g Io bal self-esteem influenced participants' decisions about 
their ideal-self traits could have occurred for several reasons. Fit, although participants were 
iduenced by their overall self-esteem. they may not have perceived it to be logical or socially 
appropriate to make comments about their global feelings towards themselves in the context of 
the study. For example, if a LSE participant was told that she was extraverted, a thought such 
as, 'But 1 don't feel good about myseif" rnay have seemed odd to express. 
Alternatively, perhaps participants did not have such thoughts, or not consciously; the 
top-dom influence of global-self esteem may operate in pan  at an unconscious leveL 
Greenwdd and Banaji (1995) and Epstein (e.g., 1985) have argued that people are not fully 
awue of their self-esteem or of its innuence on their thoughts and actions. One's "implicit" 
seif-esteem rnay be inaccessible, Epstein ( 1985) has argued, because it is so ingrained, 
unquestioned, and consisting in part of content that k nnt encoded in hguage. In conmt, 
people may be more aware of and therefore able to comment on their self-concepts in specifïc 
domains. If Brown ( 1993 b) is correct in his assertion that global self-esteem is affective in 
nature and colours specific self-views, this affective colouration may well operate at an 
unconscious IeveL which may leave people aware only of their speci£îc self-views, and not of 
how their affection for themselves influences their conclusions about thernselves. 
Although the bulk of our data are consistent in supporting a top-dom perspective, a 
hding that seems to contradict it is that although HSEs came to accept possession of their 
Ideal-self traits to a greater degree than LSEs, both HSEs and LSEs increased their ratings of 
how much they possessed their traits £hm rnass testing to the study. If global seksteem 
drives one's conclusions. such that HSEs are likely to conclude they possess positive traits and 
LSEs are not. LSEs should not have increased their self-ratings. It is possible that this increase 
is due to self-presentational b k s ;  the m a s  testing context may have felt more anonymous to 
students than the labontory context, and thus they may have become more self-aggrandizing in 
the laboratory. Alternatively, LSEs' increased ratings could indicate that self-enhancement 
strivings override the top-down influence of self-esteem to at least some extent. 
However, when LSEs' ratings of the importance of the trait are taken together with 
their increase in possess ratings, the findings may in fact be consistent with a top-dom 
perspective. Initially (in mass testing), LSEs rated their Ideal-self traits (which they did not 
feel they possessed) as more important thm did HSEs. This result is consistent with previous 
evidence that LSEs value domains in which they are weak to a greater extent than do HSEs 
(e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Harter, 1996). When our LSEs later increased their ratings of 
how much they possessed their traits, however, they lowered theV importance ratings. This 
self-defeating pattern was not seen in HSEs. hdeed, previous research has shown that HSEs 
are more likely than LSEs to engage in a certain self-serving strategy concerning importance 
ratings; afier receiving unfavourable feedback conceming some dimension, they lower their 
ratings of the importance of that dimension (e.g., Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Harter, 1986). 
The present results suggest that LSEs not ody f d  to devalue vaits that they are weak in, but 
that after improving theV self-views on some dimension, they lower the importance they place 
on that dimension. LSEs' shift in importance ratings suggests a svikingly self-defeating 
stntegy. which may reflect the top-down influence of their low seif-esteem. 
In Defense of Other Pers~ectives 
AIthough the domain-specific top-down perspective canot account for HSEs' and 
LSEs' differential acceptance of desired traits in our study, specific self-views rnay have a 
greater intluence on self-evaluative processing in other contexts. Swann and colleagues 
(Swann et al., 1989) have found that, in some situations, specific self-views may have stronger 
effects than global self-esteem on people's choices of what feedback to seek. Perhaps specific 
self-views have p a t e r  influence for feedback seeking than for feedback acceptance. Future 
researc h could explore the role of domain-specific self-views by including participants with 
varying specific self-views as weil as Merent leveis of global self-esteem. 
Similady, out data do not rule out the possibility that bottom-up processes could 
operate in other contexts. Our use of particuiarly self-discrepant positive feedback may have 
handicapped bottom-up processing. Because participants' IdeaCself traits were ones they had 
initially felt they did not possess, they may have had relatively few corroborating mernories for 
these traits (although they were able to find some supporting evidence). Perhaps if participants 
had considered positive but somewhat les  self-discrepant traits, they would have found more 
conoborating mernories, and such evidence wouid have more strongly innuenced their 
conclusions about the traits. 
It is even possible that participants in the present snidy did rely on specinc evidence to 
evaluate their standing on their Ideal-self traits, but that LSEs and HSEs dBer in their 
standards of what constitutes sufEcient evidence to substantiate a trait. Perhaps LSEs need 
more evidence to be convinced than HSEs do. This possi'biiity would fit with Baumeister et 
aL's (1989) suggestions that LSEs are slow and cautious about claiming to have a desirable 
sait Arguing against this possibility, however, is the hdïng that the amount of evidence that 
participants found did not predict their conclusions about possession of the traits. For 
example, if LSEs need more evidence to be convinced, those who found more evidence should 
have k e n  more convinced, but our regression results did not reflect this. A remaining 
possibility is that USES and LSEs may not differ in the amount of evidence that they require to 
be convinced, but in their interpretations of the evidence; LSEs may be less able than HSEs to 
interpret the evidence they 6nd as supportive of the trait. Our simple counts of pieces of 
evidence would not have captured this difference. For example, perhaps a previous experience 
that we coded as evidence 'Yoi' the trait mriy have been considered irrelevant by a LSE 
participant. This possibility could be addressed in future studies by reincorporating a 
procedure we have used in the past, where participants rated the degree to which they saw 
each piece of evidence as supportive of their possessing the trait 
Bevond Either-Or 
We have considered top-down and bottom-up processes as largely alternative 
possibilities for how self-relevant information is processed. However, a more complex model 
that comprises aspects of both bottom-up and top-down processes may be needed to M y  
understand how people draw conclusions about themselves . For example, Eisenstadt and 
Leippe (1994) suggested that only if a discrepancy exists between feedback and Actual se6 
concept-a decision perhaps made via to p-dom processes--wiii a bo ttorn-up evidence search 
ensue. However, their model does not clearly delineate the top-down components of the 
process. Some researchers have approached a top-dowdbottom-up integration with respect to 
seIf-esteem (e-g.. Peiham & Swann, 1989; Swann & Schroeder, 1995). Peihm and Swann 
(1 989) have proposed that previous experiences and specinc-self views may serve a bottom-up 
role as the "building blocks" of seIf-esteem, but that these building blocks are also impacted by 
top-down influences such as the hming of the importance of various "blocks." Further 
empirical exploration is needed of how top-down and bottom-up processing may interact in 
dfierent contexts or stages of processing. 
In sum, although we acknowledge that other processes may operate in other contexu 
and that bottom-up and top-down processes rnay interact, we conclude that the global top- 
down perspective best accounts for our findings that HSEs came to accept positive feedback 
and possession of desired traits to a greater extent than LSEs did. Assuming that this 
conclusion is correct, why would top-down rather than bottom-up processing guide people's 
self-evaluations on desired traits? Perhaps this rnanner of processing is a more efficient mode 
of processing the large volumes of self-relevant information people face every day; not only 
does it require only one overarching construct (ie., high versus Iow self-esteem) to guide the 
interpretation of incornhg idormation, but it also may operate uncohsciously, thus sparing 
attentional resources for other tasks. 
Positive and Negative Thinking 
In addition to examining top-dom versos bottom-up processing, we also examined the 
positivity versus negativity of people's thoughts after receiving feedback. Contrary to our 
predictions, HSEs did no t express signiflcantly more positive thoughts about themselves than 
did LSEs, nor did LSEs express more negative thoughts about themselves than HSEs. Instead, 
the key difference between the two groups was in the baiance of positive and negative thoughts 
they expressed: HSEs expressed approximately equd numbers of positive and negative 
thoughts about themselves, whereas LSEs made more negative than positive statements about 
themselves. These hdings conaast with previous suggestions that LSEs are largely neuval 
and even-handed in their responses to feedback, whereas HSEs show a preponderance of 
positive self-serving biases (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Brown & Mankowski, 1993). in 
our participants' thoughts about their self-concepts, it was the HSEs who appeared to be even- 
handed, whereas LSEs showed a prepondemce of negative thoughts. Perhaps HSEs had 
more negative thoughu than usual because they were considering a trait that they onginally 
believed they did not possess. 
Our fmdings with respect to the positivity of thoughts are, however, in iine with the 
suggestions of Kendall ( 1992). In contrast to the emphasis of researchers such as Taylor and 
Brown ( 1988) on the importance of positive biases for maintainhg psychological heaith. 
Kendail has asserted that the degree of negative thinking k as important as the degree of 
positive thinking. He has argued that healthy inaviduals tend to have both positive and 
negative thoughts, rather than an absence of negative thoughts (Kendall, 1992; Kendall, 
Howard, & Hays, 1989); the pattern of thinking that we saw in our HSE participants seems to 
fit with this suggestion. Our HSE participants' greater acceptance of their Ideal-self traits may 
not have been due to a particuhr abundance of positive thoughts, but to the absence of the 
disproponionate number of negative thoughts that LSEs had. Ako consistent with Kendall's 
emphasis on the importance of both negative and positive thinking was our finding that both 
positive and negative domain-rehted self-concept composite scores predicted participants' 
ratings of how much they possessed their Ideai-self traits. The negativity of LSEs' thoughts. 
like their seemingly self-defea~g SM in beliefs about the importance of positive uaits they 
possess, rnay again be a product of the top-down influence of global self-esteem. Given such 
negative thought patterns, it is no wonder that LSEs' self-esteem does not change for the 
better- 
Effects of Feedback 
An additional issue we investigated concemed whether explicit feedback on a self- 
discrepant trait would have dEerent effects on participantsT thoughts than sirnply considering 
such a trait. It appears that feedback may have uiggered a heightened state of seif-cornparison 
and self-reflection; participants who received Ideal-feedback expressed more self-concept- 
related thoughts t han did participants in the no-feedback condition. Ho wever, our results also 
suggested that self-cornparison processes do not occur only after feedback. Participants who 
sirnply mused aloud about an Ideal-self trait considered the same amount of and type of 
specific evidence as did participants who received Ideal-feedback. It seems very possible, 
ho wever, that the Think- Alo ud procedure, in which participants spo ke their tho ug hts doud 
ont0 a tape recorder that would later be heard by the researcher, prornpted self-cornparison 
processes more than privately thinking about a trait would have. 
Although feedback did influence the number of domain-reiated self-concept thoughts 
and trait-definition thoughts, it did not af5ect participants' self-views conceming their 
possession of the Ideal-self trait more than did simply musing about the trait. Both Ideal- 
feedback and no-feedback groups came to believe they possessed the trait more than at mass 
testing (and this was especially m e  for HSEs). Again, the particuiarly self-discrepant nature 
of our feedback may have lessened its influence; feedback may have a greater effect on self- 
evaluations when it is moderately rather than extremely self-discrepant (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 
1993). ALternatively, it is again possible that the instructions for the no-feedback group to 
muse about the trait and the Thlik-Aloud procedure itself had an impact; they may have 
prompted thought processes that resulted in as much accepmce of the trait as receiving 
feedback about the trait. Thus, the Think Aloud task may have been suffiCient in itseif to 
trigger some son of self-cornparison process. Future research could explore this possibiüty by 
examining and contrasting the responses of participants who neither receive feedback nor 
undergo a Thhk Moud task. The absence of feedback effects on some of participants' 
reactions is consistent with previous evidence that reactions such as perceived ability and 
predictions for future performance are consistent with seif-esteem rather than with feedback 
(McFariin & Blascovich, 1981). 
Methodo lonical Contributions 
Our study also incorporated two fairly novel methodological techniques. Our method 
of both tailoring feedback to individuai participants (like Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994) and 
matching HSEs and LSEs on the self-discrepancy of the feedback is a significant improvement 
over most success feedback manipulations. This technique dows us to be more confident that 
merences in the way the Ideal-self traits were perceived do not account for the self-esteem 
dBerences that emerged. Moreover, the technique dowed us to differentiate the role of 
global self-esteem fiom that of specific self-views in guiding top-down processing. Future 
studies could benefit fiom employing such t a i l o ~ g  methods. 
In addition, our design incorporated a more open-ended measure of participants' 
responses than has k e n  used in the pst. The Thllik-Moud procedure aIlowed us to glimpse 
the types of thoughts participants have when considering their standing on a desired trait, 
rather than only to witness the outcome of these thoughts. As aresult, we learned more about 
participants' tho ughts about desired traits than we could have fcom closed-ended measures 
done. For exmple, the Think-Moud responses aliowed us to examine whether participants 
seemed to consider specific evidence, and the degree of positivity and negativity of their 
thoughts, which the closed-ended possess ratings could not speak to. Furthemore, the Think- 
Aloud data dowed us to see differences between the spontaneous and prompted thoughts that 
participants reported. In their Thïnk-Aioud narratives, participants considered more negative 
than positive evidence for their Ideai-selfaaits, whereas when later explicitly prompted to k t  
evidence, they reported more positive than negative evidence. We recognize, however, that 
the difference between prompted and unprompted thoughts was confounded with time, 
because the prompted mesures were coliected later. 
The Think-Aloud procedure ais0 revealed differences between the thoughts that 
participants actually produced (or, at lest, the ones they reported) and their perceptions of 
their thought processes. Most interestingly, LSEs reported conducting more positive than 
negative evidence search afier no-feedback but more negative than positive search after Ideai- 
feedback, w hereas HSEs reported CO nducting more positive than negative search in bo th 
conditions. Ho wever, this reported differential effîxt was not refiected in the outcome of their 
searches; both HSEs and LSEs described the same amount of evidence regardless of feedback 
condition. Furthemore, LSEs reported positive search to be more difncult than did HS& 
although again this was no t reflected in the bits of their searches. These diffennces between 
thoughts reported and perceptions of searches may occur because those perceptions may 
retlect personal theories that are not vaiid. For example. LSEs' reports of diffiiculty searching 
for positive evidence and their reports of looking for more negative than positive evidence 
;ifter positive feedback may reflect a theory that it is impossible for them to possess Ideal-self 
rrah, or a theory about their own self-defeating tendencies-both of which may not correspond 
with their actual ability to £ind positive evidence. A related possibüity is that these Werences 
between perceptions and thoughts reported point toward aspects of feedback processing that 
are not entirely consciou. For exampk, LSEs' abïIity to reauit positive evidence rnay reflect 
self-enhancement urges that they are not aware of. DiBerences such as these would not have 
k e n  noted without the use of the Think-Aloud task. 
Although usefui, the Think- Aloud procedure is not without its ümitations. It cannot 
get a tme "window" into people's thoughts. Speahg  one's thoughts into a tape recorder 
rernoves the pnvate context in which one's thoughts normaliy occur, and rnay have caused 
participants to be more awue of self-presentationai concem. For example, participants rnay 
have censored sorne highly positive or negative thoughts. Further, the act of speaking one's 
thoughts aloud requires that they be at least sornewhat organited and coherent, which rnay 
alter the nature of the original thoughts. In addition, unconscious processes are clearly 
impossible to capture in a seif-report format. We have suggested that the top-down influence 
of global self-esteem rnay have k e n  beyond participants' awareness, which rnay explain why 
participants did not expbitly express thoughts about their global self-esteem. 
A finai methodologicd issue concerns our inclusion of only female participants in our 
study. Our results rnay not generdize to males. Given that previous findings concerning 
gender dzerences in se if-esteem have k e n  inconsistent (e.g., Josep hs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 
1992), the role of gender in processing of positive feedback wiU be an interesthg area for 
hiture exploration. 
The issues that we have explored in this research are of great applied as weîi as 
conceptual interest. Our findings suggest the present road of inquiry eventuaiiy rnay uiform 
interventions targeted at improving self-esteem, long a core issue in clinical treaunent. Our 
conclusion that the processing of self-relevant uiformation may operate primarily in a top-down 
fashion highiights the importance of o v e d  acceptance and affection for oneseif in the 
establishment and maintenance of healthy self-esteem levels. From this perspective, the 
childhood roots of self-esteem are crucial (e.g., Brown, 1993b; Brown & Dutton, 1995; 
Peiharn & Swann, 1989). as is the role of aec t .  If data continue to support this understanding 
of the nature of processing feedback, interventions targeted at improving seif-esteem in adults 
rnay be advïsed to abandon bottorn-up attempts to boost self-views, such as purely cognitive- 
be havio tuai ap proaches, or simply providing success ex penences. Instead. dinicians may be 
advised to focus more on unconditional acceptance of the self, such as in a Rogerian approach 
(cf. Brown, 1993b). A greater understanding of the way top-down and bottom-up processes 
interact rnay ultimately inform clinicians on the optimal combination of such approaches. 
Our hdings with respect to the differentiai balance of positive and negative thinking 
about thernselves in HSEs and LSEs ako hold implications for chical treatment. An 
overrepresentation of negative thoughts relative to positive thoughts is what set LSEs apart 
from HSEs in our study. Furthemore, the number of negative thoughts about their self- 
concepts was a significant predictor of our participants' conclusions about their possession of 
Ideal-self uaits. These hdings support Kendall's ( 1 992) suggestion t hat treatment gains rnay 
be more strongly influenced by a focus on reducing negative thoughts than on hcreasing 
positive thoughts. 
Conclusions 
We set out to explore the largely neglected question of why the self-esteem of LSEs 
does not appear to profit kom positive feedback. Through examination of the spontaneous 
thoughts and later conclusions of HSE and LSE individuais, we found rhat bottom-up evidence 
searches did not convince people of their standing on a uait; iastead, people's conclusions 
about themselves appear to have been guided by the top-dom Muence of their global self- 
esteem. Thus, although LSEs may ternporarily enjo y positive feedback. the ovemding 
influence of their preexisting self-esteern may ultimately prevent them kom accepting 
possession of positive tnits to the same extent that HSEs do. This top-down perspective may 
help to explain why low self-esteem remains so intransigent, despite positive feedback. if 
one's pre-existing self-esteem colours and guides the processing of new information. feedback 
in any particular domain could not be expected to have a k i n g  effect on such beliefs, nor 
could any evidence gmered to support the feedback. Future research should focus on how it 
may be possible to circumvent LSEs' "self-esteem-coloured glasses," to aiiow them to make 
greater use of positive feedback that they encounter in their &S. 
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Appendix A 
Means, Standard Deviations, md Interciirrelatirins of Think-Moud Cate~ories 
Table Al  
Means and Standard Deviations of Think-Aloud Categories 
Category Mem Standard Deviaticin 
Previous Experience "ForTT 
Previous Expenence "Againït" 
Socid Cornparison "Upwards" 
Sc~cid Cornpariscm "Do wnwdsTT 
Feedback from Others "Positive" 
Feedback h m  Others "Negative" 
Cornpuison with Prototype 
Self-Concept on Trait "For" 
Self-Concept on Trait bbAgÛinst" 
Self-Concept Related Trait "Positive" 
Self-Concept Rehted Trait "Negative" 
Description of Change 
Reflected Apprabk 'Positive" 
Rehcted Appraisais "Negative" 
Importance - "Positive" 
Importance - "Negative" 
Externd Exphation 
Association with Other 
Chuacteristic of Prototype "Positive" 
Characteristic of Prototype "Negative" 
Su btyping 
Importance of Subtype 
Note. Vdues in table retleçt mean nurnber of Ulstances coded for that çategory. 
- .l - - - ' I D  ' - ) .  . . ' .  6 .  , - - ~ L ; . o t = U - = '  "'
~ = ~ ~ 3 ; t n . , , 3 N L 3 t 4 - -  * Z3z- 
Appendix B 
Univruiate Analyses of Critegories in Think-Aioud Ctimposites 
Table B 1 
Univÿriate/Repeated Measures Tests of Catenones in Evidence Com~osites 
Categories 










Note. With the exception of MS Error values, entries in table are F values. 
b d Previo us experience. Social comparisons. ' Feedback h m  others. Cornparison with 
prototype. ' Evidence composite. 
* g < -08. ** g ç .05. *** g < .O 1. 
Table B2 
Univaririte/Reperitect Mesures Tests of Categories in Self-Concept Com~osites 
Categories 








Note. With the exception of MS Error values, entries in table are F values- -
b " Self-concept on trait. Self-concept on reiated trait. Reflected appr&d. ' Positive 
change. ' Seif-concept composite. 
* gc .O8. ** ~ ~ 0 5 .  * * Q c  .Ol. 
Table B3 
UnivluiatefRe~eated Measures Tests of Catenaries - in Definition Corn~osites 
Categones 
Source çh.of proto." imptce.of traitb subtypec compositeJ 
Note. With the exception of MS Error values, entries in table are F values. -
b d Characteristic of prototype. Importance of mit. ' Subtype. Definition composite. 
* Q <  .O8. ** g <  -05. ***e< .O[. 
Endnotes 
I It w u  not feasible to use Kappa as an anssessrnent of inter-rater agreement. Participants were 
ençouriiged to speak without organizing «r c l ~ g  their thoughts. in m rttempt to obtain as 
"natwd" a thought sample possible. This resulted in narratives that were often quite 
disorgmized and informal. Thus it was not possible to parse the narratives into meaningfd 
units upcin whicli to cdcukte agreements and disagreements. Our interest w u  more in the 
mount o f  e x h  type of thought in each narrative rather than in the specifc wording or location 
cif the thought. Correiations approprhtely retlect agreement an this dimension. 
We did explore this more uditiond approach as weU. However. exmination of 
correlation matrices and factor structures of the Think-Aioud categories did not reveal a 
çonceptudy sensible organization of these coding categories. 
3 Univariate andyses for the categories in each grouping ;ire presented in Appendix B. 
4 When mus testing "irnponmce" ntings were included as a covariate in thk andysk, the 
main effect of self-esteem became msghai rather thm signincuit, F(1,41) = 3.40. g = .072. 
5 When mus testing "importance" ntings were included as n covuiate in this anaiysis, the 
main effect of self-esteem becomes signincmt, E(1,36) = 4.25 g = .047. 
6 B w d  on p u t  research that h a  ssuggested that a distinction between specitic and sumrnq 
behaviourai mernories may be important (e.g., Klein. Loftus. & Sherman. 1993). each piece of 
evidence was aLs« coded as referring to either a "speçificTT (single, dkrete) previous 
experience or to 'benerill" previous experience. For example, the two just described 
were considered "generd" and a "*specificT7 instance wss: "'a cashier rr verchanged me muid I 
went bück to give the extra money." However, because very few of "speçaic" 
examples were .seen, the specific and gnerd  categories were colpsed. 
